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About the Working Paper Series 
This article is one in a series of papers addressing one or more issues of critical 
importance to the acquisition profession.  A working paper is a forum to accomplish a 
variety of objectives such as: (1) present a rough draft of a particular piece of acquisition 
research, (2) structure a “white paper” to present opinion or reasoning, (3) put down 
one’s thoughts in a “think piece” for collegial review, (4) present a preliminary draft of an 
eventual article in an acquisition periodical, (5) provide a tutorial (such as a technical 
note) to accompany a case study, and (6) develop a dialogue among practitioners and 
researchers that encourages debate and discussion on topics of mutual importance.     
A working paper is generally the “internal” outlet for academic and research institutions 
to cultivate an idea, argument or hypothesis, particularly when in its infant stages.  The 
primary intent is to induce critical thinking about crucial acquisition issues/problems that 
will become part of the acquisition professional body of knowledge.  
It is expected that articles in the working paper series will eventually be published 
in other venues such as articles in refereed journals and other periodicals, as technical 
reports, as chapters in a book, as cases or case studies, as monographs, or a variety of 
other similar publications. 
Readers are encouraged to provide both written and oral feedback to working 
paper authors.  Through rigorous discussion and discourse, it is anticipated that 
underlying assumptions, concepts, conventional wisdom, theories and principles will be 
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A LOGISTICS REVOLUTION 
There is an ongoing logistics management revolution in the Department of 
Defense that is taking weapons systems life-cycle support from the shadow of 
acquisition into the daylight of a highly focused success oriented enterprise.  Although 
there are many laudable attributes in this enterprise such as Force-Centric Future 
Logistics and Performance Based Logistics, the surety of achieving success in the 
logistics revolution will be a certainty by addressing and correcting certain structural 
weaknesses that have compromised excellent logistics performance for decades.  It is 
the intention of the author to highlight those weaknesses and recommend corrective 
actions. 
CHANGE THE CULTURE TO ACHIEVE FORCE CENTRIC 
LOGISTICS ENTERPRISE (FLE) SUCCESS  
A true logistics enterprise that pervades all levels of the DoD and each of the 
armed services will maximize operational availability. That enterprise will feature 
improved reliability, reduced maintenance and replenishment cycle times, reduced 
logistics footprint and a more rigorous approach to life cycle cost management. The 
imperative that will enable a new logistics enterprise is cultural change. Critical analysis 
of logistics failures shows the root causes to be cultural failures. We must change the 
rewards and incentives for every activity that impacts logistics. The Defense Acquisition 
Executive Summary (DAES) must be changed to include Operational Availability as a 
key baseline target and at the same time this target must have service-wide 
commitment.  The Army is on the right track by requiring reliability as a key performance 
parameter in the acquisition process.  
Overcoming cultural inertia is difficult. As a result of the rewards that are 
presently in place, we under-invest in logistics, proliferate configurations, and most 
importantly, we don’t match spares inventories to demonstrated failure rates, and we 
tend to accept contractor claims such as reliability at face value.  While Performance 
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Based Logistics has the capability to improve the correlation of inherent reliability and 
demonstrated reliability, it is essential to have a mandatory steadfast focus in this area 
for consistent progress.  Operational Requirements offices pursue goals of higher, 
faster and further, without considering the effect on logistics elements, logistics footprint, 
acquisition timeline, program cost and program complexity.  It is significant to note that 
although we consistently and are presently pursuing the aforementioned behavior, once 
the system is operational we are content with an 80% MC rate with certain subsystems 
consistently degrading MC and never ask why we bought capabilities that are 
marginalized after fielding.  Contract officers take the path of least resistance and 
underplay logistics incentives. Engineers focus on performance and minimize the 
effects on reliability.   We can see that the wrong incentives have produced 
compromised logistics.  In and effort to improve logistics performance, we have 
embraced PBL, but the best-written contract cannot correct bad logistics behavior or the 
shortcomings of legacy systems that are old, poorly designed or not well understood.   
Our logistics culture in our new enterprise must be one where comptrollers, 
contracts specialists, lawyers, engineers, logisticians and program managers make 
policy and decisions based on success-oriented logistics outcomes.  Furthermore, those 
who review programs must become more informed about logistics issues and provide a 
robust logistics check and balance.  Additionally, independent Logistics Review Groups 
(LRG) must be revitalized in all the services.  We need to change to a culture where 
everyone’s efforts add value to the entire enterprise and not just a part. Our culture 
must become one where all the players in the logistics enterprise are rewarded for the 
same thing: meeting operational availability targets that provide the battle-space 
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THE CURRENT LOGISTICS ENVIRONMENT HINDERS FLE 
Cost, Schedule and Performance  
The most significant inhibitor to a successful logistics enterprise is that Program 
Managers are rewarded for COST, SCHEDULE and PERFORMANCE only.  There is 
the emerging trend to include supportability or reliability as a measure and PBL requires 
PM leadership that could lead to modifying the Defense Acquisition Executive Summary 
(DAES).  The natural tension between program cost, schedule, and performance and 
logistics funding in the absence of operational availability targets as a fourth 
requirement in the DAES, precludes any opportunity to achieve a true logistics 
enterprise.  
Not Acknowledging the High Cost of Logistics  
The logistics component of weapons system ownership is resource intensive. 
Policies, manpower, funding and logistics authority must correspond to the realities of 
the resources necessary for supporting a weapon system throughout its life. The 
intensity of life-cycle support costs must be factored into acquisition planning processes 
at every level.  For example, the estimated cost of ownership of an F/A-18 is $4M per 
year. That is more than $80M per airplane for 20 years of ownership in constant year 
dollars.  According to a NAVAIR brief “Relating Business Processes To Warfighting 
Outcomes” to the CNO on 8 January 2003, the current cost to operate an F/A-18C for 
one hour is $9,700 and for the F-14D it is $20,000 per hour.  Recognizing the true costs 
of the logistics enterprise would raise the level of awareness at all levels and promote 
the need for better performance/cost/support trade-offs. 
In this regard, successful implementation of PBL has the potential to provide 
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Wrong Rewards for the Operating Forces 
In the operating forces, the operational chain and the operators are rewarded for 
hours flown, hours steamed, sorties generated and other operational measures of 
success, but not for logistics performance or husbanding very expensive airplanes or 
ships or tanks, etc.   In the Navy each succeeding Carrier Group Commander strives to 
outdo their predecessor’s measures of success by flying more hours, getting more traps 
and sorties.   This behavior accelerates the wear-out of systems and the cost of 
support. We must change the rules and reward faithful type-commander support and in 
turn reward fleet operating units for good logistics support and well executed 
maintenance.  
HOW TO ACHIEVE FLE SUCCESS 
Establish a Program Baseline Ao 
First I recommend we establish the requirement for all Program Executive 
Officers and Program Managers to include a Readiness Target (Ao) in the Defense 
Acquisition Executive Summary Baseline.  Additionally I recommend that each chief of 
Staff of each service commit to meeting program readiness targets.  
Program Actions Must Enhance Reliability, Maintenance and Cycle Times 
Every echelon of acquisition and logistics from ALT to the operating unit must 
add value to the logistics product.  No action should be taken that reduces or 
compromises reliability, adds to maintenance cycle time or increases maintenance 
actions or increases configurations. Acquisition and logistics activity should be a joint 
enterprise.  
Verify Logistics Performance through Testing 
Testing specifically for logistics is a particularly important scheme that will assure 
the performance of enterprise elements. Currently, this is an area of weakness that can 
easily be improved by making it a robust requirement funded to the necessary levels.   
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Stop Configuration Proliferation 
An important tactic is to minimize configuration changes.  Too often, we forward-
fit but because of funding constraints we do not retrofit. Unnecessary changes only 
serve to keep logistics in a continuous state of instability.  In general, modification 
practices require duplication of all the logistics elements.  We must avoid logistic 
dislocations due to insufficient funds for modification kit hardware and installations and 
the inability to modify the entire inventory.  
Change the O&S Budget Process 
While we are attempting to advance logistics technology on all fronts, the 
logistics budget process remains a dinosaur and seriously undermines the logistics 
enterprise.  All programs are the victims of asymmetric funding.  Program acquisition 
funds are for three years and logistics funds are for one year and are in no way tied to 
any specific program at the appropriation level.  The allocation of O&M funds to 
programs and other logistics budget activities is a tug-of-war between the DoD, the 
service, the SYSCOMS, and the fleet operators.  In this stressed funding environment, 
operating hour account managers tend to spend into logistics accounts.  To make 
matters worse, O&M is becoming THE budget target of opportunity more than ever.  It is 
significant to note that many systems have reached the end of their production and as a 
result, the procurement dollars used to subsidize sustaining engineering, stops with the 
end of production.   However, the need for this critical funding continues. The present 
culture just doesn’t see logistics with an appropriate sense of priority and the 
comptrollers are no exception. O&M is still seen as the bill payer to smooth the rough 
edges of the budget activity process throughout the fiscal year.  
What should we do about this situation? I propose that we totally revise the O&M 
account: First we should identify logistics funds for all those categories identified for 
program life-cycle support by logistics elements and reprogram those funds as we do 
procurement money.  Next, we should fund general logistic support elements such as 
CALS, JEDMICS etc. in what we would call a “Weapons Systems Support Account” as 
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the new priority Operations and Maintenance effort in a new Operations and Support 
Account.  Then I would fund the routine O&M activities such as POL and pencils out of 
a named lower tier O&M account.  If we were to adopt these measures, we would be 
more efficient in the allocation of program support funds, have greater accuracy of 
program cost requirements and be better able to depict, articulate and defend resource 
requirements in a new logistics enterprise.  
Ensure Fidelity in the IPPD, SE and IPT Processes 
Employing the current tactics of Integrated Planning and Process Development, 
Systems Engineering, and Integrated Process teams are important steps in engaging 
the future logistics enterprise, but we have to apply more fidelity in their execution.  
When we examine teaming from the logistics and program perspective, we see the 
need for an expanded team whose players include not only logisticians, systems 
engineers, contracts, lawyers, comptrollers, but also Congressional Members, Staffers, 
field activities and industry.  While we have shown we desire producing a system in the 
shortest time, with the best performance, the highest quality, and the best cost, 
inititiatives such as spiral development lead to incomplete logistics.  
Require Technical Education for Logistics Managers 
An important change to be made in our logistics culture is to change the 
educational requirements of our logisticians.  I propose that we establish a two-tier 
system for logisticians.  The first tier would require engineering graduates (ME, EE, IE, 
etc.) for acquisition logistics and the second tier would require graduates with general 
BS/BA degrees combined with experience or additional technical course work for 
sustaining logistics.  Weapon systems are more complex, logistics support systems are 
more complex, and team communications are more complex.  Moreover, decisions at all 
levels have become more complex and mistakes are more costly than ever. The 
Congress has recognized this and as a result passed the DAWIA.  In this environment, 
the logistics manager has to be well educated in technical matters as well as business 
matters.  Not only must logisticians have a technical background they should have 
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strong analytical skills and be critical thinkers. Graduate education for senior logistics 
management positions should be mandatory.  During the time I was the Assistant 
Commander for Logistics and Fleet Support at the Naval Air Systems Command, most 
of the new logistic interns were graduate engineers.  This is a trend that must continue.  
I recognize that we are a few years away from this posture, but we must go there.  We 
urgently need balanced viewpoints in the value-net working trade-off decisions. 
Specifically logisticians must be able to understand systems functional analysis: 
functional allocation, reliability allocation, complexity analysis, cost analysis and so on.  
In addition they must have some knowledge of modeling and simulation and 
spreadsheets.  
Change the Civil Service Classification of Logisticians 
Now this brings me to an interesting point- All civilian logisticians in all the 
services, regardless of their levels and kinds of education are classified as 346s, an 
administrative function.  We need to correct this serious disconnect by reclassifying 
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CONCLUSION 
Cultural barriers have continued to undermine logistics practices.  No future 
logistics enterprise can succeed without changing rewards, incentives and instructions.  
Because of the technical complexities in our weapons systems and modern 
culture, logisticians must be able to interact with engineering at all levels so that they 
may be proactive, credible and influential. This can be achieved by upgrading the 
technical education of logisticians and adopting the two-tier system I have proposed.  
Logistics culture will greatly improve by tearing down the barriers to knowledge, 
confidence and trust.  To properly provide for support of increasingly expensive 
weapons systems, our budgetary processes must be changed so that support funds are 
a direct part of any program and bring fiscal balance for the whole and not the part.  We 
must use our weapon systems in peacetime operations so that we don’t accelerate 
wear out.  Incorporating these changes will produce a panorama of skill sets that will 
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